Kostas Lapavicas je grški marksistični ekonomist, ki trenutno predava na Šoli za orientalske in afriške študije Univerze v Londonu. Leta 2015 je bil izvoljen kot poslanec na listi Sirize, po njenem razpadu pa se je pridružil odpadniški stranki Popularna enotnost. Najbolj znan je kot zagovornik izstopa Grčije iz evroobmočja. Z njim smo se pogovarjali v Ljubljani, kjer se je mudil na programski konferenci Plan B za Evropo, ki jo je organizirala Iniciativa za demokratični socializem.

Lapavicasa smo vprašali, kaj se levica lahko nauči iz poraza Sirize.

(klik) The lesson that the left should draw from the capitulation of Syriza is first of all that we need a clear economic and social plan of standing up to the forces of the European Union which are inherently conservative and will oppose any kind of radical attempt to change economy and society. We need a clear plan that will allow us to deal with that and that means a clear plan of dealing with the monetary union and the policy of European union more generally. The second lesson is, it's an old lesson that Syriza forgot, social change is never an easy thing. It will find and meet tremendous opposition from powerful forces outside the country and inside the country. If you belong to a party or tradition that wants to bring social change you've got to be determined. You've got to be determined to do it and you've got to break eggs in order to make it happen. 

Pri čem je torej Sirizi spodletelo? Ali je mogoče Evropsko unijo reformirati?

(klik) What cannot be reformed is the European monetary union, for sure. Syriza believed that it can stay in the EMU, continue to use the euro as the money of the country with all the institutions and the regulations that surround it and implement radical policies while doing that. It genuinely believed this and it believed it could go and negotiate with the lenders and persuade them to allow them to implement this policies in the context of the eurozone. This is impossible. I said that openly, so did many others. It was impossible for the people to accept it and now it's been proven true. So that was the biggest mistake that Syriza made. In other words it suffered from „diseased europeanism“, believing that somehow Europe is this transcendental disembodied thing that is good in itself. That was the biggest miscalculation it made or mistake it made. On top of that it wasn't determined enough to implement domestic policies bringing into conflict with big business or other interests.

Kako pa komentirate navedbe Grške komunistične partije KKE, da je Siriza živela v iluziji, da lahko upravlja grški kapitalizem?

(klik) I don't like this generalizations. The left has used this generalizations many many times. It thinks it is saying something, when it's actually saying nothing. What does it mean that it is in illusion to manage Greek capitalism. It means nothing. It seems to be saying something but is says nothing, right. And that's a problem that the Communist party has suffered from. Instead of coming up with doable proposals about what can happen tomorrow morning it has wasted six years arguing about generalities, about capitalism, socialism and so on, which mean nothing or very little to people. That's why the Communist party has failed to increase its support. This failure is as historic as the failure of Syriza by the way. Communist party members and supporters should think about it. Greek capitalism is going through a dramatic crisis and the Communist party has been absent. So managing capitalism means very little or nothing. We need to be concrete. And when it comes to being concrete, the Communist party isn't that successful. Because they themselves are actually in favour of staying in the eurozone, they've said so openly.

Ali je Siriza imela plan B? Mediji so namreč poročali, da je imel Varufakis pripravljene načrte za uvedbo vzporedne valute?

(klik) Yanis Varoufakis never wanted and still doesn't to take any country out of the eurozone. Never. There never was any desire to do so. Never was any planning for doing so. Never was any debate of any seriousness or mobilization of resources to plan such an action. What there was, was discussion how to deal with particular moves that the lenders might make which would allow for the prolongation of negotiations. Upping the ante as it were. To me, this was a failed policy from the beginning. It was never going to work and it didn't. But there never was a plan to get Greece out of the eurozone. Such a thing didn't exist.

K razpadu stranke. Kdaj je bilo jasno, da različnih struj znotraj stranke ni več mogoče konsolidirati?

(klik) The direction Syriza took, or was taking, became very clear already on the 20th of february 2015, less than a month after the elections. At that time the lenders forced Syriza to sign a preliminary agreement that eventually lead to the capitulation. Yanis Varoufakis signed that agreement as it happens. It's important to remember that, because we can be very confused about things. So it became very clear at that time already and 25 or 30 of us said no – we should not sign it. And we voted against it at the parliamentary group. Ok. We said this is a bad agreement it's gonna end up in tears. So it became very clear at that time that the paths were diverging. But you've got to remember Syriza was incredibly popular among the greek people and internationally in february, in march, in april. People thought something would happen and we expected more battles to happen, so we had to stay in. And we did. We stayed in and we fought to the end. We didn't fight in the best possible way, I agree. We made mistakes. But our mistakes were tactical mistakes. They were not strategic mistakes. We didn't abandon our principles. We didn't compromise. On the contrary, we surrendered ministerial positions, positions as MP's. We didn't compromise. But we made mistakes, yes, we made mistakes.

Mediji sicer pogosto navajajo le moč evropskih institucij kot razlog za zlom Sirize, pri tem pa ne upoštevajo manka demokratičnosti v stranki sami. Kdaj se začne konec demokracije v Sirizi?

(klik) The transformation began straight after the elections of 2012 when the group around Tsipras began to detach itself from the normal mechanisms of Syriza, began to detach itself from that, and began to develop parallel processes and parallel mechanisms and began to move closer to the established forces of the Greek ruling class. This could be seen on the individual level, the meetings that Tsipras and others had but also in terms of how they related to Syriza as an organization. Syriza started to become less important, the Tsipras group started to become more important and being connected to the Greek bourgeoisie and also to the international bourgeoisie. Tsipras travelled a lot , talked to a lot of people, tried to establish himself as an international persona. At the time I was not in Syriza, actually I never joined Syriza but I was always collaborating with it – but at the time I argued that this is not what should be happening, Tsipras should be strengthening the party and its rootedness in Greek society. This didn't happen. So the process became bigger and bigger and bigger. When power was taken over in 2015 this process was increased exponentially. The group around Tsipras became separated effectively. They started making policy the way they liked and even Syriza became totally irrelevant as a body. Even the parliamentary group started becoming less important. The only place where some debate was had was in the parliamentary group and that's because we were there. Syriza itself became irrelevant. The group around Tsipras then capitulated, Syriza split and so on.

Bi lahko trdili, da je šlo za oportunizem od samega začetka?

(klik) In history you have events that are partly planned, partly accidental, partly responses to other events. It would be an enormous exaggeration of the intellectual capabilities and the political acumen of the Syriza leadership to say they thought this through. These people cannot think a week ahead. They go from day to day, from week to week. What I can say is that instinctively they knew they were going in a conservative direction but there was no plan in this sense. Instinctively they moved in this direction however and started managing people to make that happen. The only real negotiation, tough negotiation Syriza– the Tsipras group – had (since they kept talking about hard negotiations, nonsense) was with the internal opposition. There they were very tough, because they knew what the danger was. With the lenders it was a different story. There they surrendered from the beginning. So the end result was to create this body that is basically amorphous – it's like a soup – with Tsipras at the top. All that talk about democracy has ended up with a presidential party in which no mechanism really works.

Kako lahko razumemo referendum o tretjem memorandumu?

(klik) The referendum showed that the Tsipras group was prepared to take opportunistic actions in the hope of getting out of tight corners, in the hope of getting out of the complete impasse that was created for Greece by the lenders. They hoped that by taking this opportunistic action they would be able to get out of the impossible position and present it to the people in some positive way and allow themselves to surrender without losing too much face. They wanted to surrender. What happened was that – well, there's not negating that there was a denial of democracy from the outside – but Tsipras was playing an opportunist game. What actually happened – and this is the biggest failure of Syriza – once the Greek people said NO and they showed that they were prepared to go down the radical path everything was possible those days. A determined opposition with a clear plan could have changed the situation and turn the tables. It was then that the betrayal of promises and surrender to the lenders became a reality and that's the biggest blow that Syriza delivered to the Greek workers and the Greek people. It's not easy, you commit yourself to know, you're ready to do what's necessary and then the leader lets you down. Then you believe that nothing is possible.

Omenjena je bila volja ljudi za radikalne spremembe. Pa si res glas OXI lahko interpretiramo tako in ne le kot vpliv karizme Aleksisa Ciprasa?

(klik) So there you have it. It could as well be true, what you are saying. Then you've got to ask, what's a leader for. The leader is the leader because the leader can change the direction of events. If Tsipras was serious about fulfilling his promises, he should have been prepared to use that opportunity persuade the Greek people with the influence he had over the Greek people to move in the right direction. He should have thought it through and have a course of action ready. He had none. He was asking for an alternative plan on friday to implement on monday. These things don't happen. So what Tsipras did was to surrender. That is the personal failure of the leader. The leader must not allow for this to happen. That's why you need a leader. The people themselves, there is a variety of opinions, a variety of views – they need to feel secure that something can happen. That's why you need a plan and a determined leader and Alexis Tsipras has failed on both scores.

Ali je torej Siriza dokončno postala PASOK? Ima sploh še kaj emancipatornega potenciala?

(klik) Syriza has not yet become PASOK, because it cannot become PASOUK since it has no money to give to Greek people. To become PASOUK you need money to start dishing out. But Syriza has lost in my judgment all emancipatory potential. Not the people who are still members, or vote for Syriza, of course not. There are many good socialists there who wish to change things and so on. But Syriza as a leading casta, the group around Tsipras and the main leaders and the main parliamentary representatives. I've got no time for this people. They've got nothing to offer to Greek society or the European left. Nothing.